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This paper investigates the introduction of the reserve clause in Major League Baseball
during the 1880s. Taking advantage of a unique data set describing the salaries for twenty nine
high-quality players throughout the decade of the 1880s, we investigate the impact of the reserve
clause as it evolved from a "gentleman's agreement" to a formal contract stipulation. We test
three specific hypotheses concerning the reserve clause: its effect on average salaries, on the
remuneration to marginal product, and the premium paid to a player for changing teams. The
evidence suggests that introducing the reserve clause reduced average salaries and the premium
for changing teams; detectable monopsony power was transferred to team owners almost
immediately. However, there was no statistically significant impact of the reserve clause on how
much players were paid for their marginal product. The empirical results indicate that reserve
clause shifted considerable monopsony power to team owners immediately after it was instituted.
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Prior to 1974 the professional baseball labor market was characterized by the so-called \reserve
clause," which tied a player's services to his current team inde¯nitely, thereby transferring monop-
sony power to baseball team owners. The reserve clause was a constant source of friction between
players and team owners throughout its history. These frictions were somewhat mitigated by arbi-
tration, introduced in 1974, and free agency, introduced in 1976, both of which essentially removed
the reserve clause for all but the least experienced players in the game. These two events have
been the focus of a voluminous literature testing how restrictions in the baseball labor market (and
their removal) a®ected several variables, including player salaries, player mobility, and competitive
balance, to name a few.
However, professional baseball did not always have a reserve clause. The reserve clause was not
formalized until 1887, before which baseball players had varying degrees of freedom in negotiating
with other teams. This paper complements the existing literature by analyzing the impact of
reserve clause, in its infancy, on the salaries of a select number of players from the 1880s. The
paper provides a unique contribution by investigating the other end of the reserve clause time line.
Using a rediscovered data set describing the salaries of several high-quality players from the
1880s, we estimate the impact of the reserve clause on average player salaries, remuneration to
marginal product, and the premium paid to players when changing teams. To do so, we employ
a two-step approach. The ¯rst entails estimating team revenue and production functions for the
decade of the 1880s, from which it is possible to estimate each player's marginal product and
marginal revenue product. The second step estimates a wage model, controlling for player marginal
product and other variables, to determine what impact the reserve clause had on player salaries
and, alternatively, the level of Pigouvian exploitation.
The evidence suggests that the reserve clause did reduce average player salaries, ceteris paribus,
but that the reserve clause did not alter the average remuneration that players received for their
marginal product. Moreover, it seems that the reserve clause did reduce, but not totally eliminate
(at least in its ¯rst three years), the premium paid to players for changing teams. In other words, in
many ways the reserve clause had the intended impact on player salaries in the period immediately
1after it was formally introduced to the baseball labor market.
As quickly as the removal of the reserve clause allowed salaries to increase, it seems that insti-
tuting the reserve clause ninety years earlier had an immediate deleterious e®ect on player salaries.
The results presented here, combined with the results obtained in earlier studies concerning the
free-agency period after 1976, strongly support the claims of baseball players and previous aca-
demic studies that the reserve clause arti¯cially held down player salaries to the enrichment of
team owners, in accordance with economic theory.
2 The Reserve Clause: History and Literature Review
The game of baseball began as a sport played by society's elite. Baseball's ¯rst organized team
was the New York Knickerbockers Base Ball Club, formed in the early 1840s and led by Alexander
Cartwright. This team re°ected more of a social-club atmosphere rather than the aggressive atmo-
sphere future teams would eventually display. According to Seymour (1960), the Knickerbockers
were more genteel in the way they handled the game, \their rules and regulations emphasized
proper conduct" (p. 15).
Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, including the Civil War years, baseball became more popular,
played exclusively as an amateur sport but in a much more democratic fashion than in earlier times.
From 1871 through 1875, the National Association of Base Ball Players, or NABBP, united the
Knickerbockers with other club teams (Gillette and Palmer 2004). Its main purpose was keeping the
sport at the zero-wage amateur level while maintaining an atmosphere of a \gentlemen's sport."
However, as a consequence of the sport's increasing popularity, a professional analogue to the
amateur sport eventually emerged.
Despite many objections, the professional era began to take root between the late 1860s and
early 1870s. Before 1876, when the still-existing National League formed, there were no restrictions
on player movement. However, with the formation of the National League, this would change.
According to Sean Lahman, \players had owned the teams and run the games, but the National
League was to be run by businessmen. They [team owners] established standards and policies for
ticket prices, schedules, and player contracts" (Baseball One Website, 2005).
2As baseball transformed into a business, labor issues soon arose. Unlike present day baseball
players, ¯rst generation professional baseball players were not compensated as full-time, year-round
professional athletes. In fact, management believed players should be employed elsewhere during
the o®-season months (Seymour 1960, p. 106). However, as teams competed for players, team
expenses began to escalate. According to Seymour, \[t]he owners soon realized what was causing
high salaries. It was competition among themselves for players. Scrambling for men jacked up
payrolls and boosted costs. The owners believed the existence of even the wealthy clubs was
threatened" (Seymour 1960, p. 106).
From the owners' point of view, there was an impetus for a system that would enable manage-
ment to prevent player salaries from increasing. Moreover, owners expressed concern that one or
a few teams might monopolize all of the best players, thereby causing a permanent distortion in
competitive balance, ultimately threatening the ¯nancial wellbeing of the entire league.
As a result, what would eventually become the reserve clause was initiated in 1879. Intended
to decrease expenses by placing limits on player salaries, the policy initially \reserved" only a few
players on each team. While a reserved player was tied to one team unless the team owner decided
otherwise, it is not clear how well the system was enforced. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
initial reserve system was not as e®ective as team owners intended. Nevertheless, Burk (1994)
described the reserve system as \the most signi¯cant step [up to that time] in a progression of
moves to limit player independence and control" (p. 63).
During the 1880s two additional leagues were formed: the American Association (from 1882-
1891) and the United Association (for one year in 1884). As the new leagues increased competition
for players, in 1883 the American Association and the National League jointly \agreed" to adhere
to the reserve clause. Thus, the original reserve system evolved into a gentleman's agreement in
which players were included on each team's reserve list by reference only (Spalding 1960), i.e., there
were no contract stipulations concerning the reserve clause. This reserve system was more e®ective
but was also somewhat di±cult to enforce as there was little recourse if one team \stole" a player
from another team. However, starting in 1887 the reserve clause was formally included in player
contracts (Spalding, p. 109), making the enforcement of the reserve clause much easier.
3Once it was formalized in 1887, the reserve clause persisted until 1974, when baseball introduced
¯nal o®er arbitration for players with at least three years of major league experience. While not
allowing for unlimited free agency, it did shift some market power to players, although players were
still tied to their teams inde¯nitely. In 1975, Andy Messerschmidt and Dave McNally sued Major
League Baseball to become free agents.1 After several months of arbitration and court appearances,
the two players were granted free agent status for the 1976 season, although only Messerschmidt
took advantage. Thereafter, free agency was introduced for players with more than six years of
Major League Baseball experience, which expanded the already existing arbitration system. As
predicted by economic theory, the shift of market power to the players caused a dramatic increase
in the salaries of veteran players, and the clear regime changes in 1974 and 1976 have been the
focus of numerous studies concerning salaries, player mobility, and competitive balance.
In the pre-free agency era, the seminal paper concerning the reserve clause was Rottenberg's
(1956) theoretical analysis of baseball's labor market. He examined the foundation and e®ects of
the reserve clause and questioned the claim that the reserve clause was needed to prevent higher-
revenue teams from dominating the market for high-quality baseball players. Rottenberg argued
that teams eventually experience diminishing returns from hiring high-quality players. That is,
ticket sales increase at a decreasing rate per \star" player added to the roster. In the pursuit of
maximum pro¯ts, it is not in a team's best interest to dominate other teams, since \no team can
be successful unless its competitors also survive and prosper su±ciently so that di®erences in the
quality of play among teams are not `too great'" (p. 254). Therefore, he concluded that without
the reserve clause in place, players would go to where they are valued the most but not necessarily
to the richest, or largest market, teams.
In the post-free agency era, several authors have investigated the impact of the reserve clause
on player mobility. For example, Maxcy (2002) examined the impact of free agency on competitive
balance through its impact on player mobility. Using a logit model to analyze player mobility
1This was not the ¯rst lawsuit concerning free agency. In 1970, Curt Flood, center ¯elder for the St. Louis
Cardinals, sued Major League Baseball after he was involuntarily traded in 1969 to the Philadelphia Phillies. Curt
Flood argued that Major League Baseball violated anti-trust statutes and sued for economic damages. Although he
ultimately lost his case, it was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court and arguably galvanized players for future action
against the reserve clause.
4during the sample period 1951-1999, he found that lower transaction costs increased the likelihood
of a player transfer. Hylan, Lage, and Treglia (1996) studied the e®ects of player mobility from
1961 through 1992, focusing solely on pitchers. They concluded that pitchers with over seven years
experience did not move as often in free-agency as they had during the reserve clause.
Depken (2002) analyzed player talent concentration before and after free agency using three
measures of the concentration of player talent in both pitchers and hitters: runs scored, home runs,
and strikeouts. The empirical results suggest that free agency improved the level of concentration
for home runs in Major League Baseball, but that, overall, the dispersion of player talent was not
dramatically altered after free agency was instituted.
Cymrot, Dunlevy, and Even (2001) studied the earnings of players who were free agents and
non-free agents when they moved from one team to another versus staying with their current team.
Using current wages and potential wages during the 1979 and 1980 seasons, a two-step Heckman
procedure was used to adjust for selection bias. Their results suggested that, whether a player was
a free agent or not, player movement was not a®ected since a player would move to where he was
valued the most regardless of who acquired the economic rents.
Levin, Mitchell, Volcker, and Will (2000) argue that competitive balance declined as a result of
higher revenue teams attracting better skilled players after free-agency. Depken (1999) found that
competitive balance was reduced in the American League after free agency was introduced but that
there was no signi¯cant improvement in competitive balance in the National League. However,
Eckard (2001), using a di®erent measure of competitive balance, found that competitive balance
narrowly decreased in the American League but improved in the National League after free agency.
Moreover, he concluded that \the bulk of year-to-year variation is explained by factors unrelated
to market size" (p. 222).
A number of studies have focused on the impact of free-agency and arbitration on player salaries;
in essence testing the extent to which removal of the reserve clause reduced monopsony power.
Scully (1974) and Medo® (1976) compared estimated marginal revenue products to the salaries of
players during the pre-free agency period. Both found that team owners had signi¯cant monopsony
power. Sommers and Quinton (1982) found that the ¯rst wave of free agents in baseball were paid
5much closer to their estimated marginal revenue product, suggesting that the reserve clause was
a binding limitation on player salaries; removing the monopsony power of team owners led to an
immediate increase in player salaries. Chelius and Dworkin (1980) were the ¯rst to estimate the
impact of ¯nal o®er arbitration (FOA) on salaries and found that FOA eligibility substantially
increased player salaries, suggesting that the reserve clause conferred substantial monopsony power
to team owners. Marburger (1994) found evidence that monopsony power was not completely
eradicated with arbitration but that it was eroded over the years between arbitration eligibility
and free-agency eligibility.
The literature focusing speci¯cally on the early period of the reserve clause is very limited. Fort
(2005) quite ably reviews and re-positions Rottenberg's insights concerning the broad literature
concerning the reserve clause. He undertakes a brief empirical investigation of how the reserve
clause impacted competitive balance in the 1880s and ¯nds adverse e®ects. Eckard (2001) also
discusses the early period of the reserve system and provides empirical evidence suggesting that
competitive balance was adversely a®ected by the reserve clause, inferring that the reserve system
was a rent-protection scheme on the part of team owners.
3 The Reserve Clause in its Infancy: Testable Hypotheses
Consider each player's salary as the outcome of a negotiation between the player, or his represen-
tative, and the team, or its representative. The contract zone, or negotiating space, can be de¯ned
by two extremes (see Pigou, 1920, Persky and Tsang, 1974, or Faber, 1976). At the lower end is
the player's reservation wage, or the minimum salary for which he is willing to play, and at the
upper end is the player's marginal revenue product, or the maximum the team is willing to pay.
The negotiation process yields an actual salary that can be considered a weighted average of the
two extremes of the contract zone, i.e., wi = (1 ¡ ®i)wr
i + ®iMRPi, where ®i 2 [0;1] is an index
of negotiating strength on the part of the player, Wr
i is the player's reservation wage and MRPi is
the players marginal revenue product.2
As ®i approaches one, the player's ability to negotiate for higher wages increases, and as ®i ap-
2This formulation is similar to Marburger (1994).
6proaches zero the player's ability to negotiate a wage greater than his reservation wage is curtailed.
Anything that in°uences ®i can either increase or decrease the ability of one party to negotiate to
their favor. While it is not possible to directly estimate ®i for any particular player, it is possible to
infer how various player, team, and general market characteristics in°uence ®i, on average, through
their net impact on player salaries.
Our formulation allows players to have di®erent contract zones because of di®erent reservation
wages, di®erent marginal revenue products, and idiosyncratic factors that in°uence their negotiation
strength. Moreover, the same player might have a di®erent contract zone with di®erent teams if
their reservation wage, marginal revenue product, and relative negotiating strength varies. The
formulation of the negotiated wage used here has the advantage of being °exible in allowing for
di®erent equilibrium wage rates for seemingly homogeneous players.
These various in°uences on the contract zone might make identi¯cation of the impact of the
reserve clause di±cult. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that during the 1880s the limitations
might not be as severe as initially feared. First, ticket prices during the period investigated were set
by the league and were common for all teams. Therefore, the only di®erences in marginal revenue
product would be in attendance di®erences. Second, the reservation wages of baseball players
were arguably lower and less volatile than in the modern era.3 This suggests that the di®erences in
contract zones across players and time may have been associated more with di®erences in negotiating
strength than in di®erences in reservation wages or the value of marginal product.
Salary data for all players during the 1880s are not available, precluding a direct estimate of
the negotiating strength of players and team owners. We can, however, estimate the in°uence of
the binding reserve clause, instituted in the late 1880s, on the salaries of a select group of high-
quality players. Utilizing an unique data set, our estimation approach allows us to determine the
net impact of the binding reserve clause on the negotiating strength of the average player (in the
sample), e®ectively testing whether the reserve clause shifted monopsony power to team owners
immediately after its inception.
Three hypotheses about the in°uence of the reserve clause on player salaries are tested. First,
3Today's high-quality baseball players have more, and more valuable, alternative sources of income than players
in the 1880s.
7did the evolving reserve clause increased monopsony power which would cause an immediate decline
in the negotiating strength of all players and therefore a decline in average salaries? This hypothesis
is formulated as:
Hypothesis 1 The institution of the reserve clause did not cause a change in average player
salaries.
We also test whether the reserve clause reduced the remuneration the average player received
for his marginal product. We compare the return to marginal product during the non-reserve
clause period of the sample with the return to marginal product after the binding reserve clause
was instituted. The second hypothesis is formulated as:
Hypothesis 2 The institution of the reserve clause did not cause a change in the remuneration to
player marginal product.
The third hypothesis follows from the Rottenberg (1956) conjecture that the reserve clause
would allow team owners to distribute amongst themselves the rents generated by a player, thereby
reducing the premium paid to a player when they changed teams. The third hypothesis is formulated
as:
Hypothesis 3 The institution of the reserve clause did not cause a change in the premium paid
to players when changing teams.
To test these hypotheses, we estimate a wage model in which we control for player characteristics
(including quality), characteristics of the market for baseball labor, and characteristics of the overall
economy in order to isolate, to the extent possible, the in°uence of the reserve clause on the variables
of interest. Speci¯cally, we control for the player's major league experience up to the current year,
and its quadratic, whether the player changed leagues, and whether the player was a non-pitcher. A
player's experience might enhance his negotiating stance with team owners as his value is revealed
to team owners over time. The turnover of teams and leagues during the early history of professional
baseball was rapid, therefore it is like that when a player changed leagues he did so at a reduced
8salary. Because there were many more position players than pitchers, it is likely that the average
salary for non-pitchers was lower than for pitchers.
An alternative to directly estimating the impact of the reserve clause on player salaries is to
estimate the impact of the reserve clause on the the amount of \exploitation" in the baseball labor
market. While this term is often associated with Marxist discourse, A. C. Pigou (among others)
used the term in his discussion of how the marginal product of labor might diverge from its real
wage (Pigou, 1920).4 In his discussion, Pigou was careful to point out that exploitation was not
just a normative issue; market forces not associated with class might cause a divergence in real
wages from real marginal product (see Pigou, 1920, Part III, Chapter XIII).5
Both approaches are taken, although the qualitative results are not di®erent and inference
is perhaps stronger using the level of exploitation. We associate various player characteristics,
interventions in the baseball labor market, the overall level of macro-economic activity, and team
characteristics, with the expected negotiating strength of players and team owners. Anything that
increases (decreases) the negotiating strength of the players would be expected to cause a net
increase (decrease) in player salaries, ceteris paribus.
4 Data, Model Speci¯cations, and Empirical Results
The empirical analysis of player salaries necessarily requires a measure of each player's marginal
product. Only after controlling for the player's quality is any accurate inference about the impact of
the reserve clause on player salaries possible. In order to determine each player's marginal revenue
product, we follow the two-step approach pioneered by Scully (1974) and utilized by numerous
other authors. The ¯rst step entails estimating a team revenue as a function of team quality,
re°ected in winning percentage, and year, city, and league ¯xed e®ects. This equation provides a
4Scully (1974) uses the term in his seminal analysis of professional baseball salaries before the removal of the
reserve clause.
5Persky and Tsang (1974) analyzed the level of Pigouvian exploitation in the U.S. economy, relating the ratio
of marginal product to real wages as a function of unionization, unemployment, in°ation, the capital stock, and
government imposed controls in the labor market. Using a time series of macroeconomic data, they found evidence
that the level of exploitation increased with unemployment, in°ation, the capital stock, and governmental intervention.
The only covariate that was negatively correlated with exploitation was the level of unionization. Using a cross-section
of U.S. industries they found con¯rmatory evidence that unionization was negatively correlated with exploitation. In
our approach we include several independent variables analogous to Persky and Tsang.
9rough estimate of the value of an additional point of winning percentage (on a scale of zero to one
thousand) to the team owner. The second step entails estimating a team production function where
output is team winning percentage and the primary inputs are team o®ense and defense. After
estimating the team production function, the contribution of a player to team winning percentage
can be calculated. This generated regressor is included in the second stage of the analysis wherein
player salary (or rate of exploitation) is related to marginal product, player characteristics, and
general market characteristics.
The salary data employed in this analysis were obtained from an article published in 1914 in the
now-defunct magazine YY. Penned by Mr. ABC, this short article titled \XXX," lists the salaries
of twenty-nine high-quality players from 1881 through 1889. The article discusses the salary issues
during the 1880s, and points out that concerns over escalating baseball salaries in the 1910s were
similar to those in the 1880s. Mr. ABC does not mention the reserve clause and its impact on
player salaries, but rather questions whether salaries are \too high" for the best players in the
league.6
We combine ABC's data, assuming that any errors are purely random, with the wealth of
historical statistics gathered by baseball historians over the past several decades. The data provide
a unique opportunity to test the in°uence of the reserve clause during its inception rather than the
more common approach of testing the in°uence of removing the reserve clause after 1976.
A. Estimating Player Marginal (Revenue) Product
Following Scully (1974), we estimate a team attendance (revenue) function:
DEPit = °0 + °1WINPERit + ÁTEAM + µLEAGUE + ¿TIME + vit; (1)
where DEPit is, alternatively, annual home game attendance or annual real total revenues for
team i in year t, and vit is a zero mean heteroscedastic error structure that is tested for ¯rst
order autocorrelation. The explanatory variables include the winning percentage of team i in
year t (WINPERit), a matrix of team ¯xed e®ects (TEAM), a matrix of league ¯xed e®ects
6Note to editors and referees: Our data source will be revealed and raw data reported in an appendix upon
publication.
10(LEAGUE), and a matrix of year ¯xed e®ects (TIME). Real total revenue is calculated as team
home attendance times $0.50 adjusted to re°ect 2004 dollars.7
The results from estimating equation (1) provide evidence of the additional attendance or dol-
lars in revenue from an additional point in winning percentage. Winning percentage is, in turn,
the outcome of player defensive and o®ensive performance, managerial decisions, and idiosyncratic
in°uences such as player injuries, team cohesion, and weather. The value of a player is there-
fore indirectly connected to team attendance or revenue through the player's contribution to team
winning; players contribute to team winning percentage through their o®ensive and defensive con-
tributions. Field position players provide defensive output in the form of ¯elding, assists, and
put-outs, and o®ensive output in the form of hits, stolen bases, and sacri¯ces. Pitchers contribute
through stikeouts, innings pitched, reduced numbers of earned runs allowed, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the o®ensive and defensive contributions of regular ¯eld players. While a large literature has
investigated various team-level production functions, using various functional forms and inputs, we
follow the approach by Scully (1974) and use two team-level measures of o®ensive and pitching
performance: slugging average and team strikeout-to-walk ratio, respectively.
The estimated production function is speci¯ed as:
WINPERit = ¯0 + ¯1TSAit + ¯2TSWit + ¯3CONTit + ¯4OUTit + ¯5NLit +
¯6UAit + ²it; (2)
where the ¯'s are parameters to be estimated and ²it is a composite zero-mean heteroscedastic error
term. The dependent variable is team win percentage, which normalizes team performance by the
number of games a team played; games played varied during the sample period. The independent
variables include the the team slugging average (TSA), team strikeout-to-walk ratio (TSW), a
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the team ¯nished the season within ¯ve games of ¯rst
7Total home game attendance were collected from The Baseball Encyclopedia. In general, team prices are not
available from this era however the National League agreed to ¯x gate prices at $0.50 in 1879. The price of attendance
to National League baseball games played in the Polo Grounds in New York was ¯fty cents for the 1903, 1904, 1905
and 1906 baseball seasons (New York Times, various editions). We assume that the other teams in the other leagues
charged the same price as the National League. It is possible teams in other leagues charged di®erent prices, but
a careful search of the existing documentation does not reveal any di®erences and suggests that ticket pricing was
determined by the league rather than the team.
11place (CONT), a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the team ¯nished more than twenty
¯ve games out of ¯rst place (OUT), a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the team played
in the National League (NL), and a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the team played
in the United Association (UA).8
The top panel of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the team data employed in
estimating equations (1) and (2). The average attendance for teams during this period was ap-
proximately 106,000 and average real gate revenues were approximately $980,000.9 The average
winning percentage is less than 500 because only teams that played more than ¯fty games in a
season are included in the sample. The average team slugging average was 336 and the average
strikeout-to-walk ratio was 2.09. Approximately 20% of the teams in the 1880s ¯nished the season
within ¯ve games of ¯rst place whereas approximately 46% ¯nished the season more than 25 games
out of ¯rst place.
Table 2 reports the estimation results of two versions of equation (1): the ¯rst uses attendance
as the dependent variable, the second uses real gate revenues. Model (1) in Table 2 indicates that
a one point change in team winning percentage correlated with approximately 190 additional fans
in attendance. On average, National League teams enjoyed attendance on par with the American
Association, however the United Association enjoyed substantially lower attendance. Over the
period of the sample, attendance to the average major league baseball team increased almost
¯ve-fold, as can be seen by the parameters on the year speci¯c time e®ects. Model (4) in Table 2
suggests that a one point change in team winning percentage was worth, on average, approximately
1,750 2004 dollars. Consistent with the attendance model, National and American League teams
enjoyed parity in revenue, however the United Association enjoyed dramatically lower revenues, on
average.10 The increasing popularity of professional baseball and the general prosperity during this
period led to a dramatic increase in the real revenues professional baseball teams generated.
The remaining models in Table 2 control for heteroscedasticity across teams (Models 2 and
8Slugging percentage is de¯ned as the total bases obtained by the team divided by the total number of at-bats.
Team and player data were obtained from www.baseballreference.com, last accessed February 2007.
9Teams in the 1880s did generate some additional revenue through concession sales. However, at the time there
were no media, merchandise or stadium revenue, nor was there league revenue sharing. We do not anticipate the
measurement error in our estimate of real total revenue to prove debilitating to the estimation results reported herein.
10This might explain why the United Association only survived for the single year of 1884.
124) and also autocorrelation (Models 3 and 5) using a Panel GLS estimator. In each case, the
qualitative results are retained, suggesting that failing to accommodate potential heteroscedasticity
and/or autocorrelation is not an underlying source of spurious results. When necessary, we use the
estimation results from Model (4) to calculate an estimate of a player's marginal revenue product.
The results in Table 2 can be used to estimate the value of marginal product, either in terms of
attendance or real revenue, once the production function has been estimated. Table 3 reports the
results from estimating equation (2) using three di®erent panel estimators. Model (1) uses a random
e®ects estimator. The data, however, display slight but statistically signi¯cant heteroscedasticity.
Therefore, we estimate the production function using a panel GLS estimator with heteroscedastic
panels but without any autocorrelation; these results are reported in Model (2) in Table 3. The
¯nal speci¯cation allows for a common AR(1) parameter. The results for these three speci¯cations
are largely consistent with each other. The estimated common AR(1) term is 0.085, suggesting
there is not a large year-to-year connection in team production. Moreover, the results in Model (3)
are based on 15 fewer observations as the teams that played more than ¯fty games in the single
season of the United Association are dropped. We therefore utilize the results from Model (2) in
Table 3.
The marginal win percentage associated with a one unit change in team slugging average is
approximately 1.08, whereas a one one-hundredth improvement in team strikeout-to-walk ratio
corresponds to an approximate 0.24 improvement in team win percentage (team winning percentage
being measured on a zero to one-thousand scale). Teams out of contention fared approximately 125
percentage points worse than teams with comparable o®ensive and defensive statistics but were not
out of contention, suggesting that being out of contention might reduce team spirit, \hustle," or
motivation (consistent with Scully, 1974). On the other hand, teams in contention performed about
105 percentage points better, ceteris paribus. Finally, teams that played in the National League
were relatively worse, ceteris paribus, suggesting that the National League had a relatively higher
standard of play, also consistent with Scully (1974). Finally, teams in the United Association, which
was in existence for only one year, were not signi¯cantly di®erent than American Association teams
at the time.
13The team production function is used to calculate the marginal product of the players in the
sample.11 Using the results from Column 3 of Table 4, each player's marginal win percentage is
calculated as
MWPit = (1000 £ SPit £ PERABit £ 1:083183) + (100 £ SWit £ PERSOit £ 0:2447136);
where SWit is set to zero for non-pitchers.
The Scully approach is not immune from criticism. The approach is \proportional," in that it
\credits the player with some proportion of his individual performance" (Krautmann, 1999, p. 371),
whereas Zimbalist (1992) recommends an \incremental" approach which measures the change in a
team's performance with and without a player. While Scully relies upon estimated revenue functions
to indirectly determine marginal revenue product, Krautmann (1999) recommends utilizing a well-
operating free-agent market to provide a direct estimate of marginal revenue products. Krautmann's
approach is the least demanding in terms of data and avoids potential speci¯cation errors; all
that is required is player salaries and widely disseminated player statistics. On the other hand,
the approach assumes that the free-agent market for players is su±ciently competitive to erode
all monopsony power, which was unlikely during the period investigated herein. Furthermore,
while Krautmann avoided estimating MRP for pitchers, the Scully approach provides an estimated
marginal product for pitchers.12
There is also a debate as to whether the strikeout-to-walk ratio is an appropriate measure of
pitcher contribution; some authors have instead used earned run average. However, as Bradbury
(2005) has shown, the ERA is vulnerable to in°uences beyond the control of the pitcher and is
not highly correlated from year to year. This suggests that the ERA is not an ideal measure
of a pitcher's marginal contribution to team success. Using the Scully methodology assures non-
negative marginal products and arguably better captures the contribution of a pitcher to his team's
11See the appendix for an extended discussion on exactly how to calculate a player's marginal product using the
Scully approach.
12Krautmann did not investigate the MRP of pitchers arguing that pitchers in the modern era are often specialists,
i.e., starters, closers, or set-up men, and therefore the appropriate measure of a pitcher's productivity is not nearly
as clear as for position players. Moreover, the Krautmann approach would sacri¯ce 40% of our sample, which seems
excessive given its already limited size.
14success.13
Several representative players are listed in Table 4 including their nominal and real salary, their
production statistics, and their estimated marginal win percentage.14 It is clear that estimated
MWPs vary across players and player-types, i.e., pitchers and non-pitchers. The descriptive statis-
tics for the marginal win percentage for the entire sample of players are provided in the lower panel
of Table 1; the minimum win percentage calculated in the sample was attributed to James Ryan
in 1885 (MWP=1.85) and the maximum contribution was attributed to Charley Radbourn in 1883
(MWP=154.71).
According to economic theory, the marginal win percentage of a player is a factor in the ne-
gotiation of a player's salary. The player's marginal product is one of the components of the
player's marginal revenue product, the upper end of the contract zone. The greater the player's
marginal product, the greater should be the player's negotiating strength, viz-a-viz other players
in the league. Moreover, high-quality players have a more credible threat of shirking and reducing
productivity if a satisfactory salary is not negotiated.
However, the marginal product of a player is not known until after the season is completed,
whereas the player's salary was (and is) typically determined at the beginning of the season. We
assume that a player's previous season's marginal win percentage (marginal product) is a rational
proxy for the marginal win percentage in the current year. Therefore, in the second stage of the
analysis, the once-lagged marginal win percentage for players (when available) is used as a proxy
for the anticipated marginal win percentage in the current year.
B. Estimating the Impact of the Reserve Clause on Player Salaries
To test whether the binding reserve clause in°uenced real player salaries as hypothesized in the
13Pitchers in the 1880s were less specialized than in the modern era. Furthermore, including ERA and other
pitching statistics directly into the team production function yields negative marginal products for numerous players.
14To calculate the marginal attendance or the marginal revenue product of each player's contribution, multiply the
MWP by the appropriate parameter estimate from Table 2. However, in the subsequent analysis, we use the marginal
product rather than marginal revenue product as the two di®erent measures di®er only by a scale e®ect and would
not fundamentally alter the regression results.
15previous section, various wage models are estimated. Their general functional form is:
DEPjt = ±0j + ±1MWPjt¡1 + ±2Experiencejt + ±3Experience2
jt + ±4NewTeamjt
+±5NewLeaguejt + ±6NonPitcherjt + ±7MacroIndext + Á0Xjt + µ0Tjt + ujt; (3)
where j indexes players, t indexes time, ujt is a zero-mean composite error term, and the ±'s and
the vectors Á and µ are parameters to be estimated.
The dependent variable is either the player's salary converted to 2004 dollars using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index, the natural logarithm of the player's real salary, or the
ratio of a player's estimated real marginal revenue product (using the results from the revenue
equation in Table 2) to his real wage.15
The explanatory variables include the once-lagged marginal product (MWP), the player's ex-
perience and its quadratic (Experience, Experience2), whether the player changed teams during
the previous o®-season (NewTeam), whether the player changed leagues during the previous o®-
season (NewLeague), and a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the player was a non-pitcher
(NonPitcher). Rather than include a simple time trend or year dummy variables to control for
inter-temporal issues common to all players, we include the NBER's U.S. Index of Manufactur-
ing Production (MacroIndex) to control for macroeconomic e®ects common to all players but
which might have in°uenced player salaries (speci¯cally their reservation wage) during the sample
period.16
The remaining explanatory variables are included in Xjt and control for the impact of the
reserve clause after its inception in 1887. To test for the in°uence of the binding reserve clause,
a dummy variable (RC) was created that takes a value of one for the years 1887-1889. To test
Hypothesis 1 in the previous section, we include the RC dummy variable as a separate regressor.
If the reserve clause reduced the negotiating stance of the players in the sample, on average, we
anticipate a negative parameter estimate on this variable. To test Hypothesis 2 in the previous
15There are potentially negative e®ects of using a ratio as the regressand (see Kronmal, 1993, for example), including
possible speci¯cation bias. On the other hand, any measurement error in the estimated real marginal product is shifted
to the left hand side of the estimating equation, where it is expected to only in°uence the e±ciency of the estimates.
16We acknowledge Brad Humphreys for this valuable suggestion. During the sample period there were two peaks
(March 1882 and March 1887) and two troughs (May 1885 and April 1888) in the business cycle.
16section, the dummy variable RC is interacted with the player's estimated MWP. If the reserve clause
reduced the remuneration to quality on the margin we anticipate a negative parameter estimate
on this interaction. Finally, to test the Rottenberg (1956) conjecture, Hypothesis 3 in the previous
section, we interact the RC dummy variable with NewTeam. If the binding reserve clause shifted
the allocation of rents to being between owners rather than being between owner and player, we
anticipate a negative parameter estimate on this variable.
Equation (3) is a reduced form model in which the parameter estimates indicate which covari-
ates convey more negotiating power to owners, which would be re°ected in a negative parameter
estimate, or to players, which would be re°ected in a positive parameter estimate. It is anticipated
that greater marginal product in the previous season, greater levels of experience, greater outside
opportunities (as re°ected in an expanded macro-economy), and moving to a new team all improve
the negotiating stance of the player, ceteris paribus. Therefore. we anticipate positive coe±cients
on these variables. On the other hand, the supply of non-pitchers was considerable larger than
pitchers (even at this early point in baseball history) and therefore the negotiating stance of non-
pitchers is expected to be worse relative to pitchers.17 Moreover, moving to a new league was likely
to reduce the negotiating stance of the player or at least the rents they could expect to extract
from the team owner. For these two variables we anticipate non-positive parameter estimates.
When the dependent variable is the ratio of the player's estimated marginal revenue product
and his wage rate, the expected signs are reversed, e.g., if the reserve clause reduced the ability
of the player to negotiate we expect a positive parameter on this variable. To estimate a player's
marginal revenue product, the player's marginal win percentage is multiplied by 1,752 (obtained
from Model (4) of Table 2).
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used to estimate
equation (6). During the sample period the average nominal salary was $2,461 ($45,872 in 2004
dollars). Because the players in the sample were amongst the best players of the day, it is likely
that the sample average is greater than the overall Major League average salary. The average
MWP for all players was 57 points. The average player in the sample had 5.8 years of experience,
17In other words, the elasticity of supply of position players is expected to be greater than the elasticity of supply
of pitchers.
17approximately 18 percent of the observations correspond to a player that switched teams from
one season to the next, approximately 3 percent of the observations corresponded to players that
switched leagues from one season to the next, and 60 percent of the observations corresponded to
non-pitchers. Approximately 43 percent of the sample observations correspond to the period during
which the binding reserve clause pertained. Finally, the NBER manufacturing index (1909¡1913 =
100) averaged 33.274, but did show a considerable range during the sample period.
The interaction terms are included in the Xjt vector in equation (3). The ±0j measure player-
speci¯c unobserved or unmeasured heterogeneities that might in°uence the outcome of the player-
team salary negotiation. Because the sample re°ects only a subset of the players in the major
leagues at the time, the player-speci¯c e®ects are treated as random e®ects. Table 5 reports
estimation results in which only player-speci¯c e®ects are included, i.e. restricting µ = 0. Table 6
and Table 7 report estimation results including player and team speci¯c e®ects, the latter re°ecting
team-speci¯c premia paid to players during the sample period.
C. The Reserve Clause and Player Salaries: Empirical Results and Discussion
Consider ¯rst the more conservative results presented in Table 5. Model (1) in Table 5 is a base
model which includes no controls concerning the reserve clause; the dependent variable is real salary
in 2004 dollars. Given the limited sample size and its historical nature the results are encouraging;
the estimated parameters have the expected sign and are generally statistically signi¯cant. The av-
erage player was paid more as he was more productive, suggesting that players were able to extract
some of the value they created for team owners. Players were paid more with more experience,
although at a decreasing rate. Players were paid a premium when changing teams but sacri¯ced
salary when changing leagues. The marginal product of non-pitchers was compensated slightly less
than the marginal product of pitchers, although the parameter estimate on NonPitcher is not dis-
tinguishable from zero. Finally, real salaries were positively related to the the NBER manufacturing
index.
The results in Model (1) of Table 5 provide a benchmark with which to compare the speci¯-
cations that control for the binding reserve clause: Model (2), Model (4), and Model (6) include
18only the RC dummy variable, whereas Model (3), Model (5), and Model (7) include both the in-
dicator variable and its interactions with MWP and NewTeam. Models (2)-(5) use real salary or
its natural logarithm as the dependent variable; Models (6)-(7) use Pigouvian exploitation as the
dependent variable.
As can be seen in the ¯rst row of Table 5, the binding reserve clause had a consistently negative
e®ect on the average salaries of players in the sample, regardless of whether salary was measured in
real dollars or natural logarithms. From the speci¯cation with real wage as the dependent variable,
the reserve clause might have reduced real wages between $3,000 and $5,000, ceteris paribus. The
negative in°uence of the reserve clause is supported by the speci¯cations that use the log of real
salary as the dependent variable; the reserve clause corresponded with a reduction of salaries in the
sample by 10%, ceteris paribus. The models in which exploitation is the dependent variable provide
a consistent story: after the binding reserve clause was instituted, the ratio of real marginal revenue
product and real wages increased, suggesting a reduced negotiating stance for the players in the
sample. However, the players in this sample were all high-quality, and intramarginal; therefore, it
is likely that lower-quality players were also immediately adversely a®ected by the reserve clause.
The results in Table 5 suggest there was not a signi¯cant impact of the reserve clause on the
marginal remuneration for player quality, as re°ected in estimated marginal product. In both cases,
the interaction between MWP and the RC dummy variable are insigni¯cant, suggesting that the
impact of the reserve clause did not change the negotiating strength of players in this dimension.
We do not include the marginal win percentage on the right hand side of the speci¯cations using
exploitation as the dependent variable.18
The interaction between the NewTeam and RC variables tests the Rottenberg conjecture that
after the reserve clause the premium paid to a player for switching teams would fall as the rents
generated by the player were more so distributed between the two team owners. The results in Table
5 strongly support the Rottenberg conjecture. In Model (3), switching to a new team after the
reserve clause was instituted had an approximately $5,500 lower premium than before the reserve
18We experimented with including the MWP on the right-hand side of the speci¯cations using exploitation as the
dependent variable. In general, the parameter estimates were positive, suggesting that better players were exploited
more so than less skillful players. Moreover, the interaction of MWP with RC was consistently positive, suggesting
that better players were exploited more, relative to lower skill players, after the binding reserve clause.
19clause. From Model (5), moving to a new team after the binding reserve clause corresponded
with an 18.5% lower salary, on average, than before the binding reserve clause. Combining the
parameters on NewTeam and NewTeam £ RC, the premium for moving to a new team was only
8% after the reserve clause rather than 23% before the reserve clause; this suggests the reserve
clause had a dramatic impact on the salaries to those players who moved from team to team,
exactly as hypothesized by Rottenberg (1956).
Indeed, the extreme version of the Rottenberg conjecture would have all rents generated by the
player being distributed between the team owners involved; the player himself would receive nothing
more than his reservation wage, i.e. the sum of the parameters on NewTeam and NewTeam£RC
should be zero. In our sample, this is not the case. However, it should be remembered that the
players in this sample are intramarginal. A weaker version of the Rottenberg hypothesis might be
applicable here whereas with a sample including lower quality players, the stronger form of the
Rottenberg conjecture might be appropriate.
The in°uence of the reserve clause on the premium paid to players for changing teams is con-
¯rmed by Model (7), which uses exploitation as the dependent variable. The positive parameter
estimate suggests that after the reserve clause was instituted a player who was traded to another
team saw their level of exploitation increase. The sum of the parameter estimates on NewTeam
and NewTeam £ RC in Model (7) is not statistically di®erent from zero. Therefore, the reserve
clause might have completely eroded the increased negotiating strength a pre-reserve clause player
enjoyed when negotiating with an owner of a di®erent team. This is exactly what team owners
intended, and is exactly what Rottenberg hypothesized about the operation of a reserve-clause
based baseball labor market.
While the results in Table 5 are encouraging and in many ways seem conclusive given the limited
scope of the data sample employed, there are at least two potential areas of concern. First is a
concern of sample selection. Obviously the sample we have is highly selective but on criteria not
made clear by the original provider of the salary data. Were players chosen because of their fame
and name recognition? Were players not necessarily chosen but rather teams? Perhaps some teams
were more forthcoming with their salary information than others.
20In one attempt to control for selection bias, we used whether the player was of foreign birth,
whether the player was from the Southern United States, and whether the player was in the top ten
in terms of home runs, runs scored, or earned run average, to identify whether the player's salary
was reported. The results were completely unreliable. The large number of players in professional
baseball compared to the limited number of players whose salaries were reported overwhelmed
the selection model. In another approach, we controlled for possible selection bias based on the
teams for which salaries were reported. We used the age of the franchise and the state in which
the franchise played to identify selection. The inverse Mills ratio was consistently insigni¯cant,
suggesting that selection bias (at least based on the identi¯cation employed) is not a signi¯cant
problem.
Another concern is potentially omitted variables, from both the supply and demand sides.
Although the speci¯cations in Table 5 include player-speci¯c e®ects, which control for unobserved
player-speci¯c heterogeneity, there might be concerns that team-speci¯c or city-speci¯c e®ects have
been excluded. Table 6 and Table 7 report estimation results that address this problem. Speci¯cally,
we ask a little more from the 200 observations and include 12 team ¯xed e®ects (Bu®alo, from the
National League, is the reference team),
Table 6 reports the estimation results having included the team ¯xed e®ects. By including the
team speci¯c e®ects, our estimation results are weakened somewhat. The impact of the reserve
clause on average salaries (average level of exploitation) is still negative (positive), consistent with
the results in Table 5. However, the impact of the reserve clause on the amount players were paid
for the marginal product increases after the reserve clause (signi¯cant at the 10% level) in the
speci¯cation using real wages as the dependent variable, but is insigni¯cant when using the log
of real salaries as the dependent variable. The statistical signi¯cance of the interaction between
NewTeam and RC is lost when including the team ¯xed e®ects. While the parameters carry the
same sign, although not the same magnitude, the standard errors are considerably larger than when
the team ¯xed e®ects are restricted to zero. This suggests that some of the reduced premium for
changing teams reported in Table 5 might have been caused by the teams involved with the trades.
The remaining parameters are all of the same sign, magnitude, and signi¯cance as before.
21Table 7 reports the team-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects, which re°ect additional real wages teams paid
players relative to the reference team, ceteris paribus. Any di®erences in the team ¯xed e®ects are
reduced form and therefore re°ect both demand and supply-side e®ects, including di®erences in
the costs of living, di®erences in reservation wages for playing in a large city (perhaps through the
\microscope e®ect"), or a weak negotiating stance on the part of the team owners in these cities is
not identi¯able.19
Looking at the estimated team-speci¯c e®ects, an interesting pattern emerges. First, almost all
of the teams in the sample paid a premium over the reference team of Bu®alo; the exceptions are
Providence and Indianapolis and the greatest premiums were paid by (in descending order) Wash-
ington, New York of the American Association, New York of the National League, and Boston.20
This suggests city size might be an important factor to the premium a player received during the
1880s. Table 7 reports the population rank of the team's host city for 1880 and 1890.21 Indeed,
there is a slight positive correlation between the population rank of the city (low number indicating
a greater population) and the premium paid to the average player (½ = ¡0:36 in both 1880 and
1890). Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the estimated team premiums from Model (3) in Table 7
against the population rank of the host city in 1890. There is a negative relationship between the
two, although there are exceptions to the general rule such as Detroit, which seems to have paid
considerably more than teams in larger cities, and Chicago, which seems to have underpaid relative
to teams in smaller cities.
D. A Conjecture about the Political Economy of the Reserve Clause
The team ¯xed e®ects from Model (6) and Model (7) suggest that Bu®alo, Indianapolis, New
19The \microscope e®ect" occurs when a player demands a premium for playing in a city in which he will receive
considerably more attention and scrutiny. Some players demand a compensating di®erential for the additional pressure
such scrutiny entails. This is arguably one component to the in°ated salaries for modern-era players in New York
and Boston, for instance. Whether the microscope e®ect would have pertained to professional baseball in the 1880s is
not clear. Newspaper accounts of the day do not focus much on the o®-¯eld behavior of players and there is virtually
no mention of baseball players during the o®-season.
20Anecdotal evidence suggests that teams in New York, Boston, and Baltimore (the closest team to Washington
between 1972 and 2005) all pay substantial premiums to players. Examples include Sammy Sosa playing for the
Baltimore Orioles, Alex Rodriguez playing for the New York Yankees, and Manny Ramirez playing for the Boston
Red Sox. All of these players were alleged to have received considerably more for their quality of play than expected.
21Population counts were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.
22York (in the American Association), and Providence exploited their players in a statistically similar
fashion, i.e., the relative net bargaining power of the team owners to their speci¯c players was about
the same, ceteris paribus. Moreover, these four teams were consistently able to exploit their players
to a greater degree than the other teams in the sample, as re°ected in the negative parameter
estimates for the other teams in Model (6) and Model (7).
When the binding reserve clause was passed in 1887 there were 19 teams in the National League
and American Association. Among the thirteen teams in our sample, only Troy and Bu®alo were
out of business by 1885 (two years before the reserve clause was instituted). This suggests that
there was a small group of team owners who were able, on average, to pay players considerably
less than other teams, ceteris paribus, whether through negotiating savvy or other compensating
di®erentials. If the parameter estimates are accurate, it would seem that there was a majority of
team owners who would have voted in the a±rmative for the reserve clause not only to improve
their own negotiating stance vis-a-vis players but to also erode whatever competitive advantage a
minority of other team owners might have had, at least in negotiating salaries. This resembles a
\raising rivals' costs" strategy and suggests that there might have been more than just owner-player
tensions underlying the reserve clause. Much more evidence is required to support this conjecture:
the ¯ndings in this paper alone do not seem strong enough to do more than hint at this possibility.
However, we did attempt the following. We dropped the team ¯xed e®ects for Indianapolis,
New York in the American Association, and Providence, as they were not statistically di®erent
from the reference team Bu®alo. For the remaining teams in business after the reserve clause we
interacted the team ¯xed e®ect with the Reserve Clause dummy variable. We then re-estimated
equations (6) and (7) including the team ¯xed e®ects and their Reserve Clause interactions. In
essence, this approach provides a ¯rst-pass test for whether, after the reserve clause, those teams
that were relatively worse at negotiating were \better" after the Reserve Clause. For ¯ve teams
the parameter on the interaction of the team ¯xed e®ect and the Reserve Clause dummy variable
was positive. Of the ¯ve positive parameter estimates, four were statistically di®erent from zero.
On the other hand, for only Pittsburgh in the National League was the parameter estimate on the
23interaction term negative and signi¯cant.22 In our sample of player salaries, those team owners
who were relatively worse negotiators before the reserve clause became better negotiators after the
reserve clause, essentially eroding any competitive advantage a minority of other owners enjoyed.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides the ¯rst empirical analysis of how the institution of the reserve clause in
professional baseball impacted professional baseball player salaries. Prior to 1883, baseball players
were essentially free-agents, whereas from 1883-1886 an informal \gentleman's agreement" reserve
clause was in e®ect. Team owners quickly realized that the voluntary reserve clause was not
enforceable and had no binding impact on player salaries or movement. Therefore, starting with
the 1887 season, the reserve clause was formalized in player contracts, ostensibly cementing team
owner monopsony power. The implementation of the reserve clause in professional baseball provides
a natural experiment with which to test whether player salaries, and negotiating stances in general,
responded consistent with a shift of monopsony power to team owners.
The literature focusing on the removal of the reserve clause in 1976 is widespread; however. data
limitations seem to have precluded any analysis of the other end of the reserve-clause time line.
This paper addresses this gap in the literature and essentially closes the loop on the impact of the
reserve clause on player salaries. The received literature has shown that the repeal of the reserve
clause led to an almost instantaneous increase in player salaries. This study shows that when the
reserve clause was instituted player salaries were almost immediately, and adversely, a®ected.
Assuming that player salaries are the outcome of a simple negotiation process and that the
reserve clause altered the relative negotiating stance of players and team owners, three straight-
forward hypotheses about the impact of the reserve clause are developed. First, the reserve clause
would be expected to reduce average salaries, ceteris paribus. Second, the reserve clause might
reduce the remuneration to marginal product. Finally, the reserve clause might reduce the premium
paid to players for changing teams, a hypothesis initially proposed by Rottenberg (1956) and tested
after the reserve clause was repealed but, to date, not investigated when the reserve clause was
22Results available from the authors upon request.
24instituted.
Using a unique data set describing the salaries of 29 high-quality players from 1881 through
1889, these three hypotheses are tested using the two-step approach pioneered by Scully (1974).
First, team attendance and revenue functions are estimated to determine the marginal attendance
or real dollar revenue associated with a one unit increase in team winning percentage. Second, team
production functions for the decade of the 1880s are estimated, from which it is possible to calculate
the marginal win percentage contributed by each player's inputs. The marginal win percentage is
combined with other player characteristics and general baseball labor market characteristics to
test whether the imposition of the various stages of the reserve clause caused a deleterious e®ect
on player salaries. We combine a player's marginal win percentage with the estimated marginal
revenue of win percentage to calculate calculate a measure of Pigouvian exploitation (Pigou, 1920),
the ratio of real marginal revenue product to real wages. The rate of exploitation allows us to more
directly test whether the reserve clause in°uenced the outcome of the negotiation process in favor
of team owners or players.
Despite the limited sample size, potential sample selection issues, and potential measurement
errors, the results are encouraging. We ¯nd that the reserve clause had an immediate economically
and statistically signi¯cant negative impact on the average salary in the sample, suggesting that the
reserve clause immediately shifted monopsony power to team owners. On average, the intramarginal
player salaries in the sample fell by 10%, ceteris paribus, suggesting that lower quality players might
have su®ered similar if not worse outcomes. We do not ¯nd evidence that the reserve clause reduced
the remuneration to players for their marginal product. However, we ¯nd strong evidence that the
reserve clause reduced the premium paid to players for changing teams, lending support to the
Rottenberg (1956) conjecture that the reserve clause allowed team owners to redistribute player
rents among themselves.
The results reported here are consistent with the reserve clause shifting considerable monopsony
power to baseball team owners immediately after its inception, the exact opposite of what happened
in 1976 when the removal of the reserve clause almost immediately shifted detectable market power
back to the players.
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27Appendix
A player's slugging average does not have a one-to-one relationship with the team's slugging per-
centage; the marginal product from the team production function overstates the marginal product
of an individual player's o®ensive or pitching contribution. To see this, note that team slugging
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where i = 1:::Nk indexes the number of players on team k, H is the number of hits (of any kind),
D is the number of doubles, T is the number of triples, and HR is the number of homeruns hit by
the players on the team, and AB is the number of at-bats by the players on the team.
An individual player's slugging average is:
SAi =
Hi + Di + 2Ti + 3HRi
ABi
; (5)
which can be rewritten as
ABiSAi = Hi + Di + 2Ti + 3HRi: (6)
















The right hand side of equation (7) equals TSAk £
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i ABik so that the team's slugging average






This, in turn, suggests that the marginal impact of a player's slugging average on team slugging







where the ¯rst term is the percentage of a team's at-bats for player i and dSPi is the change in a
player's individual slugging percentage.23
For non-pitchers, slugging average captures their contribution to team win percentage. However,
during the 1880s all pitchers hit, and therefore pitchers contributed to team win percentage through
their o®ensive and pitching e®orts.
It is possible to derive the marginal impact of a pitcher's individual strikeout-to-walk ratio on







An individual pitcher's contribution to the team strikeout-to-walk ratio is the product of that
pitcher's strikeout-to-walk ratio and the percentage of team strikeouts for which the pitcher ac-
counted.
23This result is alluded to, but not derived, by Chelius and Dworkin (1980) and Krautmann (1999).
28Combining the two derivatives it is possible to calculate each player's marginal win percentage
as:
MWPit = (1000 £ SAit £ PERABit £ MPTSA) + (100 £ SWit £ PERSOit £ MPTSW);
where SPit denotes player i's slugging average in year t, PERABit denotes player i's percentage of
team at-bats in year t, MPTSA denotes the marginal product of team slugging percentage, SWit
denotes player i's strikeout-to-walk ratio (pitched) in year t, PERSOit denotes player i's share of
team strikeouts pitched in year t, and MPTSW is the marginal product of team strikeout-to-walk
ratio.
29Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Team Data (1880-1889)
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
WinPer Team win percentage 490.17 137.71 171.71 824.56
Attendance Team home attendance 105,691.30 73,148.44 11,000 353,690
TR Real total Revenue 980,443.20 691,850.90 96,470.01 3,393,656
TSA Team slugging average 336.23 35.99 253.03 445.71
TSW Team strikeout-to-walk ratio 209.43 115.98 56.84 684.54
CONT Less than ¯ve games from ¯rst 0.19 0.39 0 1
OUT More than 25 games from ¯rst 0.46 0.50 0 1
NL Team played in National League 0.51 0.50 0 1
UA Team played in United Association 0.05 0.22 0 1
AA Team played in American Association 0.43 0.49 0 1
Obs/Teams 154/40
Player Data
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
SALARY Nominal salary 2,461.38 989.13 875 7,000
RSALARY Real salary (2004 dollars) 45,871.65 19,116.55 15,373.75 131,040
lnSALARY Log of real salary 10.64 0.47 9.64 11.78
EXPLOIT Pigouvian Exploitation= MRPi=wi 2.56 1.46 0.19 8.92
RC Binding reserve clause (1887-1889) 0.43 0.49 0 1
MWP Marginal Win Percentage 45.67 20.83 1.85 154.70
Experience Player experience in years 5.85 3.72 0 18
Experience2 Quadratic of experience 48 59.40 0 324
NewTeam Player changed teams 0.18 0.38 0 1
NewLeague Player changed leagues 0.03 0.17 0 1
NonPitcher Player is not a pitcher 0.60 .049 0 1
MacroIndex Index of Manufacturing Production 33.31 3.35 26.8 38.60
Obs/Players 200/29
Notes: Average team win percentage doesn't equal 500 because only teams with at least ¯fty games played are included.
Strikeout-to-walk ratio measured in hundredths. Certain dummy variable means do not sum to one because of rounding.
NBER Manufacturing Index obtained at http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/rectdata/01/a01007a.dat
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Population Rank 1890
Notes: Team salary premiums are from Model (3) in Table (7). City population ranks obtained from
the U.S. Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027.
html
37